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TRANSFORMATION — PRACTICAL LESSONS
Greg Padula
C5T Corp
Shiloh, IL
This  paper  will  provide  a  glimpse  into  the  transformation  of  the  Tanker  Airlift  Control  Center  (TACC)  between
1997 and 2003.  It will provide my perspective and lessons as the functional lead during that time. It does not neces-
sarily represent an official position.
Introduction
Figure 1. The TACC facility – Part of the M2K
transformation
The TACC commands and controls 1200+ aircraft
and 600+ mission per day to 50 plus countries per
day.  The command and control (C2) functions are
diverse: from regularly scheduled missions much like
an  airline,  to  “irregular  operations”  such  as  contin-
gency missions, training missions, scientific missions
to the Antarctic, rescue missions around the world, as
well as classified, presidential support, and Air Refu-
eling (AR) missions.
A small group of visionary TACC and Air Mobility
Command (AMC) Commanders set the TACC and
the Air Mobility Command on a transformation ven-
ture called TACC 2000, M2K, and M21. This effort
leveraged the best practices of industry through col-
laboration with various airline and distribution opera-
tions centers and continuing with the hiring of Delta
Airlines to help lay the ground work.  This paper will
provide some insights from the operational and pro-
ject lead perspectives. It will describe the reason for
change (the problem), the catalyst for change, how
we  organized,  some  of  the  results  of  the  effort,  as
well as provide some lessons observed that could be
applied to other transformations and change.
The Problem
The Problem that drove the transformation stems
mainly from the need to work in a peace and wartime
global environment – dynamically. Dynamic opera-
tions became an imperative with the changing threat
and the requirement to adapt to civilian Air Traffic
Management (ATM) Constraints. But with the chang-
ing threat, international airspace congestion, and re-
duced manning of our aircrews, all coupled with the
need to better use our resources (aircraft and air-
crews), it was clear that obstacles to obtaining our
operational need had to be addressed.
The Catalyst
In the past, many within AMC had recognized that
becoming more efficient was good, but not impera-
tive (because of the tremendous success record of
AMC and the TACC). The new studies of airspace
and AMC leadership
made it a must do.
Then Brig Gen Wil-
liam Welser (now retired Lt Gen) hired Delta Air-
lines (DAL) for a short study of the TACC. The study
produced what the expected – there is much room for
improvement. Then Brig Gen Duncan McNabb (now
AMC Commander) assumed command of the TACC
and said “the planets are aligning;” it is time to move
out on a transformation path. He hired DAL back for
phase 2 and appointed me as the operational project
lead  in  the  TACC  transformation  –  that  we  now
named TACC 2000.   Lt Gen Woody Hogle sup-
ported  many  hard  decisions  such  as  data  link.  The
support of Gen Tony Robertson, then AMC Com-
mander,  can  be  summed up in  his  words,  “This  is  a
must do, do not wait
another day.”
How We Organized
It required I. Building the team, II. Building the vi-
sion, and III. Implementing.
I. Building the team
Lean - matrixed - integrated team. Many practical
constraints drove the effort, such as resources (e.g.,
money and people). Initially the TACC 2000 initia-
tive started with 2 full-time people and leadership
support to transform the TACC. Then BG McNabb
A Must do, do not wait
another day – AMC/CC
I. Building the Team
II. Building the Vision
III. Implementing
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made a partnership with the AMC technical director-
ate (AMC SC: Col Mel Flack). Col Flack assigned
Col Terry Williams as the lead for the technical part
of the transformation. Col Williams led the
technical end, I led the functional end. We both
formed a small office to build the functional and
technical views together.
Core Team FIO-SIO: Leverage and
integrate functional and technical
efforts. These 2 offices (Functional
Integration Office (Lt Col Chris
Stuhldreher) and System Integration
Office (Lt Bill Col Sweger) (FIO-
SIO) met daily to build a plan, solve
issues, and implement various solutions to fill our
capability gaps. These integration offices had charters
that required participation from the rest of the staff in
AMC.  A key advantage of the FIO and SIO was to
leverage current processes and resources to into a
focused effort to implement the “Capabilities”
needed for the M2K vision. These Integration offices
grew to about 10 people each – but they leveraged
and focused many efforts both in AMC,
USTRANSCOM, and other AF, DOD, and Civil
Aviation organizations (like FAA and Eurocontrol).
The organization did not grow; the manning was real-
located from other areas.
FIO: Single Source of requirements; SIO: Enterprise
system look. A  chartered  task  of  the  FIO  was  to  be
the single source of requirements for the transforma-
tion. (It was later recognized that the TACC was of-
ten leading transformation for the command (AMC)
and that was not the role of an execution organiza-
tion.   Prior  to  the  FIO,  there  was  not  a  single  voice
for TACC requirements. Anyone that had a require-
ment went direct to the functional managers for the
systems and advocated for their desire (not necessar-
ily even a valid requirement). Similarly, to the FIO,
the SIO became the single source to insert cross cut-
ting requirements into systems – an enterprise view.
Because of the close relationship between the SIO
and the FIO, technical reality was quickly brought
into the equation of transforming the TACC. The
close and frequent interaction (daily) between the
FIO and SIO and at the O6 level eliminated a lot of
staffing and posturing. It produced trust and a vision
that could be implemented (vision with practicality).
Council of Colonels: Part of our decision body was a
Council of Colonels that met monthly. These were
key TACC stakeholders that would be responsible for
implementing their piece of the solution (most of
which were cross domain issues – i.e., beyond these
leaders own span of control). Additionally, we
worked closely at the deputy division chief level to
vet ideas, build solutions, and in the process build a
significant amount of trust which indirectly translated
change management and progress. If vetted through
the Deputy level, working at the Colonel level be-
came much easier.
Global Partners for MAF Transformation: It
was clear very early on that global partnerships
or  at  least  cooperation  was  required  for  the
Mobility Air Force (MAF) global mission. The
question was how large to make the network
before we would get bogged down. I decided
to work internal to the key MAF Command
and Control (C2) Colonel (O6) leadership in
Europe and the Pacific as well as key Colonels in the
Guard and Reserves. These key stakeholders were
involved  in  each  key  decision.   Europe  was  pivotal
because increased civil air traffic congestion was
delaying TACC operational missions. On the other
hand, the Pacific covered the largest physical area of
MAF C2 and had different issues. These leaders not
only provided insight to the processes we were build-
ing but provided requirements (and some money) for
AMC  C2  systems.  This  process  not  only  captured
good ideas and innovation by these global experts
(and their teams), it made AMC and TACC processes
much better for less money. We were able to capture
great innovation that was occurring in Europe by
such  folks  as  then  Majors  Tom  Nunamaker  and
Tom Manley.
Leadership: It  is clear that the leadership was an in-
tegral part of the transformation team (Gen Robert-
son, Gen McNabb, Gen Welser, Gen Mike Wooley to
name a few) as well as the others I have mentioned.
They helped form and validate the vision and its im-
plementation and their leadership was essential in
overcoming many roadblocks / resistance to change.
It is amazing that even with four-star general officer
direction there was significant resistance.
Informal structure:  We had a “brain trust” of people
that were visionary and practical. They were often in
O6 leadership positions – but not always. This infor-
mal team included visionary folks in the Europe, the
Pacific, and USTRANSCOM (some of the individu-
als involved include Col Nick Sipos, Col Paul Wil-
liams, and Col Roger Warnick). This small group of
individuals allowed the team to come up with accept-
able transformational ideas and projects that could be
refined and implemented across the global structure.
Feedback Structure -- M2K Advocates: M2K “advo-
cates” were key members of the team that not only
provided feedback on all aspects of M2K they were
The Team
- FIO-SIO
- Council of Colonels
- Global Partners
- Leadership
- Informal Structure
- Feedback Structure
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our eyes and ears and were able to capture the inno-
vation at the unit level. Furthermore, these advocates
provided a solid connection to the user in all the areas
we could think of (including aircrew, to C2, base
operations, airfield management, and maintenance).
As you can see, “advocate” does not adequately de-
scribe their role. We carefully selected them to be
diverse, grounded, trusted at the unit, and visionary.
Then we trained them formally on the vision and how
to help facilitate and influence its implementation.
II. Building the vision – with “practicality”
Vision greater than TACC: It did not take long to
recognize the vision required for the TACC to oper-
ate in a global dynamic environment was much big-
ger than the TACC. However, it also made sense for
the operations which needed the change to drive the
vision and its implementation. The vision evolved
very quickly to 3 high level goals. Just by establish-
ing and communicating these goals, we were able to
identify many aspects to implement the vision.
I n t e g r i t y  - S e r v i c e  - E x c e l l e n c e
AC2ISRC
TACC
DO’s Staff
AMC Staff
MAF
USTRANSCOM
PACOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM
AC2ISRC
ESC
ASCIndustry
FAA
International  Environment
EXPANDING THE VISION -(Crawl, Walk, Run)
DO
AMC
PACOM, EUCOM, CE , …
ESCIndustry
FAA/CAA
ternational  Environment
NORAD
TSA
EuroControl
CAF
AFRL
AFC2ISRC
Figure 2. TACC Capability requires a cross domain
solutions – and an International and Joint perspective
Goal1: Seamless Processes – this included many
cross domain processes. It was always process first.
We built an “as is” and then a “to be” process.
Goal 2: Seamless Systems that provided “information
at the fingertips” of the decision makers.
Goal 3: Assured connectivity – We needed this so we
could have collaboration among the decision makers.
We needed links between multiple ground nodes as
well as air nodes.
Figure 3. Integrated Flight Management is a subset
of Mobility 21
Cross Domain Solutions: We considered many areas for
improvement but especially across these 3 domains: 1)
Military Command and Control (peace and contingency
locations), 2) Domestic and International Civil Air Traf-
fic Management, and 3) the Aircrew crew.
III. Implementing
The approach: The solution was a revolutionary
change in a mostly evolutionary way. We did this
mainly in a “Crawl, Walk, Run” manner.  It required
“Vision with practicality.” Leadership support and
change management were more important the more
revolutionary the change. We focused on results rela-
tively quickly. We worked the longer term items, but
used the success of the short term implementations to
keep momentum. Approach was capabilities based,
used common sense and had just enough analysis to
make good decisions (see lessons observed).
Capabilities Management (C-R-r): The entire proc-
ess we built was structured around implementing the
M2K Capability (C) – which remained our focus. To
obtain that Capability, we often had to fill enterprise
(cross domain / or
multi-systems) Re-
quirements (R), and
finally we had to work
with the traditional
requirements process
that works individual requirements (r) through Func-
tional Managers and then Systems’
Program Managers.
The solution: The solution was multi-prong. It was
about developing and managing the capability needed
to respond in all global environments verses build-
ing/improving a system or communication path.
Managing Implementation
- Capabilities Focused
- Common Sense
- Practical
- Implementation Focused
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DOTMLPF:  We looked at Doctrine, Organizational,
Training, Material, Leadership, Process, and Facility
(DOTMLPF) as potential solutions. Each of these
areas was part of our potential solution set. This is
common in AF solutions.
The roadmap: We built a roadmap with 371 items.
The visibility of this helped keep the implementations
on  track.  This  was  tracked  on  multiple  levels  on  a
daily basis by the FIO-SIO. They identified the issues
that were not meeting expectations / milestones were
highlighted.
Decision points: The highlighted issues were solved
at the lowest level possible, often at the FIO-SIO or
the technical and function leads. If not resolved there
they were brought to the Council of Colonels and on
semi-annual basis to the General Officer Steering
group (GOSG). This GOSG was led by the AMC
Commander and attended by many AMC General
Officers at Headquarters AMC and USTRANSCOM
and many field locations attended by VTC.
Collaboration:  We used many forms to collaborate
within our team including regular face-to-face meet-
ing, telephone, and the web to gather/distribute in-
formation.
Figure 4. Systems view from requirements to billing
The Results
This effort moved the TACC (and PACAF and
USAFE C2 structure) from mostly a mission moni-
toring and management by exception organization to
a proactive mission and sortie management organiza-
tion. Initial Capability was stood up in about a year
and a half of start. The close partnership between the
Operations and technical community allowed us to
have 62 builds of our integrated management tool
and prototype in use in an operational environment in
12 weeks. The speed and functionality of this effort
could only be done with someone bridging the Ops –
tech gap. Visionary and dedicated people like Steve
Hofmann often brought operational changes to the
developer nightly.  This provided the template for the
information that the Flight Manager needed to man-
age missions dynamically and globally. Once we
built the view we needed we went about trying to fill
the holes in data that we had. It needed to gather in-
formation from 9 different systems.
The M2K transformation resulted in several spin offs
including the Velocity Initiative (VI). VI goals were
mainly to move the mission faster. We used a similar
method of transformation to drive this initiative, ap-
pointing a lead and leveraging M2K advocates from
across the US, Europe, and the Pacific. We held sev-
eral face-to-face meetings, built and coordinated an
implementation plan, and then tracked implementa-
tion through the M2K process / team structure. These
efforts are still ongoing. VI and M2K are being insti-
tutionalized into AMC’s Capabilities processes.
Lessons Observed
The Right Team: Not too big, but diverse and repre-
sentative. Look for knowledge, experience, openness,
influence, and passion. The right people will work
much more efficiently. Build a team diverse enough
to link to every level, but that is lean enough to proc-
esses decisions relatively quickly. Consider using a
structure like M2K, including the FIO-SIO, formal
and informal network, Brain Trust, and advocates.
There must be a Champion at the top and at multiple
levels.  AMC/CC active support was essential, but
without other advocates at many levels it would have
failed. The collective team support not only manages
and implements elements of M2K, but also changes
the underlying organizational culture.
Vision with Practicality: Build the vision, morph it,
but stay focused on the practical. We did not shoot
for the 100% solution or 100% information to make
decisions. We knew that perfect information cost
infinite dollars and time. Furthermore, the solution
that we wanted was often a long-term solution. But
there were many solutions that were lower risk and
less expensive that would allow us to move forward.
Do not compromise the long-term vision, but review
the technical and financial risks to see if it is practical
to implement in the needed timeframe. Also consider
what is impractical for one level of authority may be
practical at a higher level of authority.  AMC CC and
the  support  he  garnered  at  the  Air  Staff  allowed im-
plementation not possible at our level. It was our job
to  understand  when  to  pass  the  baton  up  to
our bosses.
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PTSOP (Put This Stuff On Paper). AMC  DO  (then
Maj Gen Brady) said this. It is a true statement and a
good  lesson.  Document  it  on  paper  early.  Once  on
paper, even if it initially misses the mark, it will
evolve into the desired document as people use this
paper strawman as a collaborative tool.
Manage the Capabilities / Obstacles. Understand the
end game, build a roadmap with a plan, and then do
not lose focus. Everything else is an obstacle to get
the capability.  Each capability should have a person
who is primarily responsible (OPR) and a small
group that that will be accountable to the manage-
ment team.  In that process, we identified obstacles to
completion. At that point, it a large part of our effort
was on obstacle management.
A capabilities look at implementation is often incon-
gruent with traditional DOD acquisition -- which is
systems based. In this new method, we focused on
the vision first, then process then solutions. To make
this work efficiently we found that a tightly knit team
of operations and technical man-
agement allowed much greater effi-
cient and effective results.
Roadmap/Visibility/Accountability:
These were essential to this man-
agement process. We started with
the Capability (and individual func-
tionalities) and built a roadmap to
fill each. Visibility of each of these
milestones / actions items brought
the appropriate attention and en-
hanced accountability. Visibility
occurred at every level depending on
the issue.  Daily interactions, weekly
web postings, quarterly Colonel
meetings, General Officer Steering
Group, and finally about every 6 months we briefed
the AMC CC and much of his staff. Just knowing that
areas would be highlighted at each level encouraged
them to be fixed. Progress was enhanced at each
level.  At last count there were 371 items that we
were tracking in the roadmap for implementation.
Tight Decision Loop: Consider a blended team like the
FIO-SIO. They added creditability, visibility, and solved
many of the problems very quickly. Have leadership
with authority at the meetings if possible. Use meetings
with a focused end in mind -- brain storming, talk about
differences, and set action items /plans ahead. Keep
accountability. Follow up on action items and publish to
the authorities – include the plan and who is account-
able. I recommend a “Brain Trust” and network to keep
you grounded and to facilitate the decision process.
Targeted Analysis: In determining practicality do not
have analysis paralysis. The amount of objective and
subjective analysis varies depending on risk and other
factors. We performed our big picture analysis using
the common sense of the experts -- “grey beards” of
our internal group. Detailed analysis was occasion-
ally needed to take us from the big picture, common
sense view to a more rigorous analytic view that
would stand up to the budget process scrutiny. For
example we performed economic analyses (EA) that
help justify the eventual cost in the hundreds of mil-
lion dollars. The “rigorous analytical” conclusions
were essentially the same that our internal group de-
rived, but we now had rigorous justification that
would stand up in many forums.
Streamline processes to implementation. Do what is
required, but think outside the box to satisfy the re-
quirements without extra work. Initial feedback from
staff members indicated that to do this transformation
we would need many requirements documents that
would take years to build. Our answer was to build a
“Detailed Requirements Matrix”
that cross referenced every re-
quirement we had to other ap-
proved documents.   This saved
over a year and kept momentum.
There was some resistance to this
approach, as with many things that
were different.
Bridge the Operational and Tech-
nical gap. These are often sepa-
rate worlds with separate lan-
guages  that  truly  need a  bridge  to
garner the best of both worlds.
The technical experts include sys-
tem builders, communication spe-
cialist, technologist, comptroller,
as well as acquisition specialist. The operators in-
clude AOC/C2 controllers, planners, flyers, main-
tainers, and any user of technical areas. The misun-
derstanding between the 2 main groups creates
huge obstacles to progress. Bridge the gap and
focusing on the seams allows one to leverage the best
of both worlds.
Leverage existing work and resources. Do not re-
invent wheels (unless required). We leveraged much
including AMC, USAFE, PACAF, FAA, DOT,
EUROcontrol, and more. We leveraged bright ideas
from airmen to Generals. For the long term areas, we
used traditional processes and built a strong partner-
ship with the AF Research Labs. We partnered with
the labs (built an MOU in 1999 to institutionalize
AFRL as part of the long term technology infusion
Lessons Learned
- The Right Team
- Vision with Practicality
- PTSOP
- Manage Capability
- Roadmap/Visibility/Accountability
- Tight Decision Loop
- Targeted Analysis
- Bridge the Ops – Tech Gap
- Leverage work / resources
- Manage / Focus on the seams
- Momentum-Continuity
- Communication / Feedback
- Change Management/Culture
- Manage Risk
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into  the  TACC  on  a  regular  basis).   The  move  to
“flight management” leveraged best business prac-
tices  of  airlines  dispatch.  In  doing  this,  we  used  the
AMC requirements process and helped focus AMC
resources  on  what  AMC  leadership  said  were  com-
mand priorities. This refocus was not always appreci-
ated or understood by those that were required to
change. We also used the traditional method of coor-
dinating -- Staffing. This formal method will produce
a coordinated position and will surely be signed out
as  it  goes  up  the  chain.  Staffing  went  much  easier
because of the team we had.
Manage / focus on the seams. Most of what we need
exists, but is not available across the enterprise. Even
if  an  80% solution  is  some where  else,  it  is  less  ex-
pensive to expand and leverage that capability than
reinvent it internally. Managing the seams can save
huge money and provide quicker and better solutions
to deliver more capability. These seams include the
process and systems seams.
Momentum- Continuity: Support and progress is
exponential to momentum. Do not lose momentum
unless there is a real show stopper, but realize the
consequences. Understand the slow down and ad-
dress at the appropriate level. Do not hesitate to go to
leadership as needed. Keep the faith with the team. If
you need to go to leadership ideally coordinate with
your trusted team leaders, but at least inform them.
On several occasions we went forward without full
concurrence and occasionally “broke traditional
glass.” I am convinced this was needed for progress
including implementing dispatch like capability. If
you just work the long term, you will probably lose
momentum, so, work the long term areas under the
“cloak” of short-term successes.
Continuity of the vision keepers and change agents is
important to implementation. When the continuity is
broken, the change will seek the steady state of the
culture. Hence, it is important to change the culture
to one of continuous process improvement.
Communications / feedback: Have a detailed Com-
munication plan ranging from face-to-face exchange,
advertising, briefings, newspaper and magazine arti-
cles, web portals, and other multi-media type events
as well as incorporation of the ideas in the Com-
mand’s policy and presentations including Command
video. The advocates provided a great feedback
mechanism. General and targeted “prototype feed-
back to users (e.g., crews, flight managers) was sig-
nificant. We also provided our feedback to them.
Change Management / Culture: Plan for and have an
aggressive Change Management plan. There was
overt and covert resistance to the change.  Some felt
change was a threat to their way of life, others
thought there were dangers in the change. We lis-
tened very carefully and addressed each concern or
changed our implementation plan. In some cases, the
resistance defied logic and in those cases we worked
to overcome it. We used personal interaction, lowest
level supervisor involvement. Many decisions were
resolved  at  the  FIO-SIO  or  Colonel  level,  but  there
were major issues that required AMC CC involve-
ment. Consequently we provided a Program Man-
agement  Review  about  every  6  months  to  the  AMC
CC  and  his  staff  as  well  as  a  VTC  for  the  remote
MAF General Officers.  These very high level forums
garnered decisions we needed. Authorization to
change the flight management process, add govern-
ment positions for flight managers, add data link for
C2 to the AMC plan were decided at these high level
meetings. Documented support helps change the cul-
ture. When M2K was identified as a Command prior-
ity, it could be used to help justify dollars for the
programs. M2K then became an excuse for innova-
tion. The culture appeared to be changing.  Culture
change is slow - years. Often some of the biggest
changes I saw were in people who experienced the
benefits of M2K in the field.  When they returned to
headquarters, they became positive change agents.
Manage Risk -- not avoid it. Risk avoidance mindset
is incongruent with revolutionary transformation.
Often as we improve one thing something else suf-
fers. E.g., if security increases it may reduce the ca-
pability elsewhere. The most secure computer is one
you do not turn on and the safest airplane is one you
do not fly (unless you are being shot at). Our great
operational/technical team was able to balance risk.
Summary
This short paper certainly did not do justice to the
M2K transformation. The success was a tribute to
many who worked way beyond what was expected. It
was  a  lean  and  agile  transformation  with  many  fac-
tors that contributed to its success some of which
were mentioned in this paper. The M2K lessons can
be applied to many other situations especially those
with dynamic changes like in DoD and Industry.
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